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OPEN AIR SEARCHES AND ENHANCED
SURVEILLANCE IN CALIFORNIA
I. INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects from unreasonable searches
and seizures. Judicial interpretation of this amendment has
evolved from property related doctrines into a concept of per-
sonal security.' The shift in emphasis from a "constitutionally
protected area" to a right of privacy has paralleled the rapid
growth of surveillance technology available to police.2
This comment explores the scope of fourth amendment
protection of privacy that an individual is entitled to outside
of closed private areas. The comment focuses on California
law dealing with technologically enhanced police observations
in the forms of electronic beepers, airplane overflights, and
binoculars. It will be shown that in technologically enhanced
scrutiny cases the California courts while attempting to apply
the reasonable expectation of privacy formulation of Katz v.
United States,8 nonetheless return to a trespass-intrusion
analysis.
The main decisional conflict appears in the treatment of
surveillance of open air activity. The reasonable expectation
of privacy test has no set parameters outside the ready limita-
tions of four walls. It is unclear whether privacy rights are
waived because potential passers-by might make observations
or whether police need to establish their own independent
ability to observe. The plain view doctrine is inconsistently in-
voked as it confronts the possibility of enhanced scrutiny. The
reasonableness of privacy expectations appears subject to con-
striction as various forms of technology gain wider usage and
acceptance.
This comment advances a test derived from the holdings
0 1981 by Isabel Gilman.
1. Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of
Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 968 (1968).
2. Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's
(pts. 1, 2) 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1003, 1205 (1966).
3. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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of two decisions, People v. Triggs" and People v. Arno.5 This
formulation should provide a standard for the measure of pri-
vacy in the open and a workable rule for the use of enhanced
visual surveillance in California.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW AND THE GROWTH OF
TECHNOLOGY
A. Property Based Notions of Fourth Amendment
Protection
Early interpretations of the fourth amendment were
rooted in property law concepts. Analysis of fourth amend-
ment violations was made in terms of "constitutionally pro-
tected areas."' Without some sort of physical invasion or in-
trusion into such an area, there could be no search.8 The
concept of a protected area was expanded over the years to
include more and more locations, 9 but there remained a re-
quirement of physical intrusion into such a space for police
observations to come within the proscriptions of the amend-
ment. Under this analysis early uses of technology were not
considered searches. In Olmstead v. United States0 the de-
fendant's telephone was tapped, but this was achieved with-
out a physical entry onto his property. The lines were tapped
on the street without disturbing the house or curtilage. The
fourth amendment could not be extended to include protec-
tion of telephone wires "reaching to the whole world" from a
house or office."
In Goldman v. United States12 a receiver was placed on a
party wall that was capable of recording conversations within
the defendant's home. Under the property based theory of the
fourth amendment this was not a search because no trespass
or intrusion had occurred. The Court could find no "practical
4. 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
5. 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1979).
6. See note 1 supra.
7. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 438-39 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
8. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
9. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. Rv.
349, 357 (1974).
10. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
11. Id. at 465.
12.. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
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distinction" from Olmstead. In Silverman v. United States,"'
however, a spike mike had been inserted into a party wall
such that it made contact with defendant's heating duct and
was capable of recording conversations throughout the house.
This was considered an unauthorized penetration into the de-
fendant's premises and violative of fourth amendment rights.
Perhaps the most strained application of the trespass
doctrine came in Clinton v. Virginia."' In that case an ampli-
fier the size of a thumbtack had been placed on a wall. Justice
Clark in his concurring opinion considered this to have "pene-
trated petitioner's premises sufficiently to be an actual tres-
pass thereof."' 5
In Lopez v. United States' the issue of electronic sur-
veillance and the surreptitious recording of conversations
arose again. An undercover agent equipped with a hidden
electronic device had recorded conversations between himself
and the defendant in the latter's office. Since the agent had
entered the premises with the defendant's consent there was
no fourth amendment violation. In a lengthy and vigorous dis-
sent Justice Brennan called for the Court to overrule Olin-
stead and fashion rules for electronic searches arguing that
"[T]he Constitution would be an utterly impractical instru-
ment of contemporary government if it were deemed to reach
only problems familiar to the technology of the eighteenth
century."'"
B. The Move Away from Property Concepts: Katz v. United
States and its Impact
Recognition that technology had limited the utility of the
trespass doctrine finally came in 1967. In Katz v. United
States 8 the Supreme Court formally rejected the traditional
analysis. The case dealt with the electronic surveillance of a
public telephone booth; a device had been planted so that the
defendant's conversations regarding his gambling operations
could be recorded. The Court declined to analyze the situa-
tion in terms of whether a telephone booth was a constitution-
ally protected area, and if so, what constituted an intrusion
13. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
14. 377 U.S. 158 (1964), per curiam.
15. Id.
16. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
17. Id. at 459.
18. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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into the area."' In a now famous passage the Court noted that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. . . .But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected."2 A fourth amendment search did not depend on the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given en-
closure.2' Rather the focus of the inquiry was turned upon the
conduct and expectations of the person observed.2
Subsequent interpretations of the Katz opinion have uti-
lized the language of Justice Harlan's concurring opinion.2 He
stated that in order to trigger fourth amendment protection,
"there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have ex-
hibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, sec-
ond, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.' "24 Justice Harlan did not reject the
concept of a constitutionally protected area,25 but he refined
what could constitute an intrusion. The trespass doctrine was
"bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of
privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical inva-
sion. 12 Later interpretations of Katz by the Court reveal that
the intrusion analysis is still viable in many situations.2 7
Former Professor Anthony Amsterdam in his seminal ar-
ticle on the fourth amendment laments the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy formulation.28 The test as it is articulated by
the Supreme Court in later decisions, 29 and as it is applied in
California,"0 has become: wherever an individual may harbor a
reasonable expectation of privacy, he is entitled to be free
from unreasonable government intrusion. The first problem
19. Id. at 350.
20. Id. at 351-52.
21. Id. at 353.
22. Id. at 350-53.
23. Id. at 360-62. (Harlan, J., concurring). See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9
(1968).
24. 389 U.S. 347, 361.
25. Id. at 360-61.
26. Id. at 362.
27. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
28. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 385.
29. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 332 (1973); United States v. Dionisio,
410 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1973).
30. People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 1104, 458 P.2d 713, 718, 80 Cal. Rptr.
633, 638 (1969).
782 [Vol. 21
OPEN AIR SEARCHES
with this test, according to Amsterdam, is that it reintroduces
the concept of an intrusion which is precisely what the major-
ity in Katz had attempted to lay to rest.3' Secondly, the ex-
pectation of privacy formula has dangerous potential. It sets
out an uncertain and easily manipulated standard.32 How can
a citizen's expectation of privacy continue to be reasonable
when he knows the technological reach of current surveillance
methods? Both of these troublesome aspects of the reasonable
expectation of privacy test, pinpointed by Amsterdam, emerge
in the California case law.
III. CALIFORNIA: SEARCHES IN THE OPEN
A. People v. Triggs: Clandestine Vantage Point and
Plain View
Current California law is struggling with the ramifications
of Katz when applied to police observations that are made in
the open. Part of the difficulty lies in determining where the
officer's legitimate plain view ends and where a person's legiti-
mate privacy expectation begins. Various factors have to be
considered in measuring the reasonableness. of the privacy ex-
pectation. Is the person observed in the open or in a tradition-
ally protected area? Were members of the public in the vicin-
ity? Was the police scrutiny clandestine; that is, was it
enhanced by technology or a covert vantage point?
In the aftermath of Katz, the plain view doctrine has
come into conflict with the protection afforded by the fourth
amendment.3 4 An observation of what is in plain view, by an
officer who has a right to be in position to have that view, has
traditionally been considered to be outside the scope of the
fourth amendment because it does not involve a search. 5 This
was logically consistent with requiring a trespass or an intru-
sion as the basis of a fourth amendment violation. Absent a
prior entry, there could be no plain view into an enclosed
31. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 383.
32. Id. at 384.
33. Electronic surveillance of conversations by wiretapping or eavesdropping is
now regulated by statute. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630-37 (West 1970). This comment
is concerned only with other forms of technological surveillance where there are no
legislative enactments.
34. Note, People v. Triggs: A New Concept of Personal Privacy in Search and
Seizure Law, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 575, 583-86 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Privacy].
35. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Harris v. United States, 390
U.S. 234 (1968).
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space. But since the concept of privacy in a public place was
ushered in by Katz, it is now possible that a person may ex-
hibit a reasonable expectation meeting the Katz test, yet be
legally spied upon under the plain view doctrine. This conflict
is particularly acute when both the person observed and the
police making the observation are in the open.
In People v. Triggs"6 the California Supreme Court was
presented with a situation that required an accommodation
between plain view observations and legitimate privacy expec-
tations. The defendants were arrested for illegal sexual acts in
a public toilet. Police hiding in the vents above the toilet stall
observed the acts. The stalls had no doors, and thus the de-
fendants had taken the risk of being discovered by members
of the toilet-using public. The court found that the possibility
of plain view observations by the public did not defeat the
defendants' reasonable expectation that police would not be
hiding in the vents. "Most persons using public restrooms
have no reason to suspect that a hidden agent of the state will
observe them. '87 Thus, the clandestine government surveil-
lance constituted an illegal search. It does not appear that the
officers had committed any trespass in positioning themselves
in the plumbing access area of the park's restroom building.
Thus, a court applying the plain view doctrine could have
found that the police had a right to be in a position to have
the view. The California court, however, found that the
method of observation which resulted in the clandestine ob-
servation of the innocent and guilty alike violated the fourth
amendment.8 Only if the officer had probable cause to search,
would his observations from the vents be sanctioned by plain
view. 9
The court differentiated between a person's expectation
of privacy from members of the public and from representa-
tives of the state.4 0 Simply because an individual risks obser-
vation by the public, he has not waived his privacy expecta-
tion with respect to the state. Whenever privacy is analyzed
outside traditionally protected arbas, it is important to con-
36. 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
37. Id. at 891, 506 P.2d at 236, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
38. Id. at 892, 506 P.2d at 237, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
39. Id. at 894 n.7, 506 P.2d at 238 n.7, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 414 n.7.
40. This is not the first expression of such a principle. See People v. Krivda, 5
Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971) (trash); People v. McGrew, 1 Cal.
3d 404, 462 P.2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969) (airline footlocker).
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sider the issue of how the potential passer-by affects the ex-
pectation of privacy.
It can be argued that the holding in Triggs was limited to
restroom surveillance and the particularly acute privacy inter-
ests involved in such locations."' The lower courts, however,
have derived more generalized principles from the opinion.2
The reasonableness of the privacy expectation may depend on
who is doing the viewing; consent to observation from some
sources does not invite observation from all sources.
Thus, in Triggs the court refused to allow plain view, a
corollary of the trespass doctrine, to rescue clandestine sur-
veillance from the fourth amendment proscriptions. In order
to protect the innocent public from the risk of observation,
the court demanded a showing of probable cause before police
could initiate surveillance. Although commentaries had hoped
that the Triggs analysis would be extended to all forms of en-
hanced surveillance,4 3 the results have been uneven. In Cali-
fornia the courts of appeal have persisted in looking for an
intrusion as the basis of their analysis rather than focusing on
the privacy expectation of the individual and the method of
surveillance involved.
B. Technologically Enhanced Surveillance: Electronic
Beepers
In People v. Smith44 the issue was the legality of the war-
rantless installation of a transponder, or electronic beeper, in
the cockpit of a rented airplane. With the assistance of this
device police had been able to track the airplane's journey to
and from Mexico on a smuggling expedition. The Attorney
General argued that no search was involved because defen-
dant Smith had no expectation of privacy for his airplane in
the open sky; ordinary radar and F.A.A. ground equipment
could have monitored the airplane in any event.48
41. Privacy, supra note 34, at. 599.
42. People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973); People v.
Smith, 67 Cal. App. 3d 638, 136 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1977); People v. Dickson, 91 Cal. App.
3d 409, 154 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1979).
43. Comment, Police Helicopter Surveillance and Other Aided Observations:
The Shrinking Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 11 CAL. L. REv. 505, 517 (1975);
Privacy, supra note 34.
44. 67 Cal. App. 3d 638, 136 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1977).
45. Id. at 651-52, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 771. This was factually incorrect. The court
points out that the plane would eventually have been lost to normal ground equip-
ment. Id. at 655, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
19811
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The court of appeal considered the situation to be struc-
turally similar to Triggs. The defendant's criminal activity
had occurred in a place potentially exposed to public observa-
tion, but police had in fact employed a form of clandestine
surveillance. The court read Triggs as standing for the pro-
position that:
[Olne's reasonable expectation of privacy is violated if the
governmental observation of criminal behavior is from a
hidden vantage point which most persons would have no
reason to suspect was being so used, and that this is true
even though the same criminal behavior could have been
observed by the police and others from vantage points at
which they had the right to be."6
Thus interpreted, Triggs should require a warrant prior to the
use of an electronic tracking device. 7
The Smith court did not, however, rest with Triggs, but
proceeded to discuss Ninth Circuit cases dealing with beeper
installations. In the Ninth Circuit's view, fourth amendment
rights must be analyzed at the time the device is planted;4 8 if
the device can be installed without a trespass or other viola-
tion of the suspect's possessory interests, no warrant is
needed. This view has been criticized as a reflection of the
trespass doctrine, which, since Katz, should no longer be the
starting point for an analysis of a form of electronic
surveillance.49
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, takes a different ap-
proach. In United States v. Holmes"0 the warrantless installa-
tion of a beeper on the fender of a truck was held to be a
search in violation of the fourth amendment. The court rea-
soned that although the defendant had parked his car on the
public street, he nonetheless had a fourth amendment right to
be secure. Since there was no way to protect oneself from this
kind of surveillance, it required judicial authorization. The
court noted:
46. Id. at 653, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
47. Id. at 648, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 769. The court took pains to point out that the
police had ample time to obtain a search warrant.
48. United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1976).
49. Comment, Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment, 13 U.S.F. L. Rav.
203 (1978).
50. 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975), rehearing granted, 525 F.2d 1364 (1976), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 537 F.2d 227 (1976).
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We are unwilling to hold that Holmes, and every other
citizen, runs the risk that the government will plant a bug
in his car in order to track his movements, merely be-
cause he drives his car in areas accessible to the public.
The presence or absence of a physical intrusion into the
interior of the car does not affect this conclusion."
In Smith the court did not refer to Holmes even though
its result was closely in line with the holding in Triggs as the
court stated it. Instead, the California court cited Ninth Cir-
cuit cases with approval and incorporated an intrusion analy-
sis into their holding. The Smith court concluded that the
fourth amendment is violated when police,
impermissibly enter private property to install electronic
surveillance equipment in a location which most persons
would have no reason to suspect is being used for such a
purpose even though other unobjectionable methods are
available for discovering and gathering the same evidence.
If the Fourth Amendment protects a person who commits
a sex offense in an open toilet stall in a public restroom
from police intrusion from a vantage point he has no rea-
son to suspect, a fortiori, the Fourth Amendment shields
the owner or renter of an airplane from police intrusion
into the aircraft itself for the purpose of installing a
tracking device .... "
One wonders how the Smith court would rule if the tran-
sponder had been planted on the outside surface of the air-
plane. There are two separate forms of analysis being em-
ployed here, and the court does not seem to recognize that the
Katz-Triggs view was developed in response to the limitations
of the trespass theory. The court could, in effect, follow the
example of the Fifth Circuit while applying the Katz-Triggs
rationale it cites. Or it might simply rule, like the Ninth Cir-
cuit cases it also cites, on the basis of the absence of a
trespass.
C. Enhanced Surveillance; Police Overflights: Privacy in the
Open Fields
The California courts of appeal have also had occasion to
consider the legality of police overflights.58 Aerial surveillance
51. Id. at 865.
52. 67 Cal. App. 3d at 654, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
53. People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973); Dean v.
1981l
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of private property poses many of the same problems found in
Triggs and Smith. There is a conflict between the plain view
of the police and the privacy expectations which can attach to
open air activity.4 Like the Smith case the decisions reflect
the same tendency to cite Triggs and Katz, but in the end to
return to the presence or absence of an intrusion as the con-
trolling question.
Traditionally, fourth amendment protection did not ex-
tend to searches in the open fields.5 Protection was, however,
extended to areas immediately adjacent to the house, thus
leading to the distinction between the protected "curtilage"
and the unprotected open field. 6 In People v. Edwards57 Cali-
fornia formally rejected the open fields versus curtilage dis-
tinction and adopted the Katz analysis for outdoor searches.
Now the question, indoors or out, is whether a person has ex-
hibited a reasonable expectation of privacy to be free from
unreasonable government intrusion." The reasonableness of
privacy expectations and the unreasonableness of government
intrusion will depend on the physical setting. In People v. Du-
mas," which dealt with the warrantless search of a car, the
California Supreme Court suggested a sliding scale approach
to privacy, where privacy rights increase as the individual re-
treats from the world. The court found a hierarchy of fourth
amendment protection, ranging from the nearly absolute sanc-
tuary of homes to sites that are entirely "public in nature."'
Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973); People v. Superior
Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974); Burkholder v. Superior Court,
96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1979). See also Granberg, Is Warrantless
Aerial Surveillance Constitutional?, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 451 (1980).
54. See text accompanying notes 61-64 infra.
55. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
56. Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853 (1968).
57. 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d at 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 633 (1969).
58. Id. at 1100, 458 P.2d at 715, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
59. 9 Cal. 3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1973).
60. Id. at 882, 512 P.2d at 1216, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 312. The sliding scale ap-
proach appears recently to have turned into all slide and no scale. See Amsterdam,
supra note 9, at 394. In People v. Schieb, 98 Cal. App. 3d. 820, 159 Cal. Rptr. 665
(1979), the court of appeal interpreted Dumas as an affirmation of the open fields
doctrine. In Soli v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 72, 162 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1980), the
court of appeal again sought to minimize protected privacy in the open and catego-
rized Edwards as articulating no more than a "rare exception." 103 Cal. App. 3d at
80, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 846. Ironically, while recent California Supreme Court cases have
extended more privacy protection to cars and their contents, the courts of appeal
have used the car based precedent of Dumas to diminish privacy rights in rural areas.
See People v. Minjares, 24 Cal. 3d 410, 420-21, 591 P.2d 514, 519, 153 Cal. Rptr. 224,
229 (1979); People v. Dalton, 24 Cal. 3d 850, 859, 598 P.2d 467, 472, 157 Cal. Rptr.
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A series of guidelines have been developed to assess the
privacy expectation. Visibility to other members of the public
appears to be a major factor in ascertaining reasonableness. A
backyard has privacy protection if it is fully enclosed.' But if
there is an easy viewpoint from a neighbor's property, a public
pathway, or an area open to common use, the expectation of
privacy is non-existent, or at least unreasonable." The pres-
ence of fencing, gates, and posted signs also emerges as a ma-
jor factor in gauging the privacy expectation that may or may
not attach to the property."
Phelan v. Superior Court64 is a recent pronouncement of
these principles. Police, investigating a tip that defendants
were growing marijuana in a rural mountain area, spotted the
garden after extensive hiking on neighboring property. In an
apparent good faith mistake, the police had in fact wandered
onto defendant's property when they made their sighting.
Two sides of the garden were enclosed by chicken wire cov-
ered with shrubbery; rocks and trees secluded the other sides
of the garden. Using binoculars, police were able to identify
marijuana leaves through the gaps in the trees.05 There. were
no footpaths or roads in the area.
The court found defendants entertained a subjective ex-
pectation of privacy that, under all the circumstances, was ob-
jectively reasonable. The isolated location, the lack of trails,
and the attempts to conceal the garden were important fac-
tors. The court then sought to determine whether the police
had violated that reasonable privacy expectation with an un-
reasonable intrusion. The court concluded that the presence
or absence of a technical trespass was immaterial. "[T]he in-
497, 502 (1979); Wimberly v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 557, 568, 547 P.2d 417, 424,
128 Cal. Rptr. 641, 648 (1976).
61. People v. Fly, 34 Cal. App. 3d 665, 110 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1973); People v.
Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973); Vidaurri v. Superior Court, 13
Cal. App. 3d 550, 91 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1970).
62. Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 511 P.2d 33, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585
(1973); Dillon v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 305, 497 P.2d 505, 102 Cal. Rptr. 161
(1972); People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 3d 80, 460 P.2d 129, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1969); Dean
v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973).
63. Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 114, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 587
(1973); People v. Little, 33 Cal. App. 3d 552, 109 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1973); Vidaurri v.
Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 3d 550, 553, 91 Cal. Rptr. 704, 706 (1970).
64. 90 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 153 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1979).
65. The court mentions the use of binoculars and videotape, 90 Cal. App. 3d at
1009, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 740, but these technological aids receive only passing reference
in the analysis. Id. at 1012, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
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quiry is not whether the officers have violated a particular
boundary line in their searching but whether they have in-
vaded the reasonable expectation of privacy exhibited by de-
fendants. The expectation of privacy defines the parameters
of the right to search."" Thus, any police intrusion into a citi-
zen's established sphere of privacy is an unreasonable
search.7
Curiously, these principles are altered when the police ob-
servations are made from the air. When police surveil these
same backyards or rural properties from the air, the courts of
appeal have not found a fourth amendment violation. Al-
though a citizen's privacy expectations may appear reasonable
on the ground, they may not be protected from overflights.
The first consideration of aerial surveillance occured in
People v. Sneed. 8 Police received an anonymous tip that ma-
rijuana was being grown somewhere on a twenty acre ranch.
Officers first drove around the premises finding nothing and
then decided to obtain a helicopter and survey the ranch from
the air. After extensive overflights, they spotted two mari-
juana plants growing in a corral. The helicopter flew as low as
twenty feet off the ground to permit these observations.
The court rejected the argument that defendants had en-
tertained no reasonable expectation of privacy because the
plants were visible to mosquito abatement helicopters and
crop dusting airplanes. Citing Triggs, the court stated:
[T]hough a person may have consented to observations
from some sources and by some persons and therefore
cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to
those sources or persons, he does not thereby forego his
Fourth Amendment protection as to intrusions from all
sources and by all persons, and particularly has not
waived his right to privacy as to government agents.69
But the court failed to pursue this analysis and based its
holding on a trespass analysis. By that logic there would be no
violation if the helicopter had flown at a legal and reasonable
height, but flying 20 feet off the ground in violation of state
statutes and federal regulations was an "unreasonable govern-
66. Id. at 1016, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 745.
67. Id. at 1015, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 744. The court cited Lorenzana v. Superior
Court, discussed in text accompanying notes 89-90 infra.
68. 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973).
69. Id. at 541, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
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mental intrusion into the serenity and privacy of ... [the de-
fendant's] backyard. 7 0
Under Katz and Triggs the privacy interest should be an-
alyzed in terms of the conduct of the individual observed. Us-
ing the rationale of Katz the question should be whether
Sneed knowingly exposed his corral to the public or whether
he had sought to preserve it as private. The height of the gov-
ernment plane involved in the surveillance should not be con-
trolling. This is akin to differentiating between an eavesdrop-
ping device that is placed outside a party wall and one that is
inserted into it.7
1
In Dean v. Superior Court7 ' a remote mountainside mari-
juana crop was again spotted by police airplanes pursuing an
anonymous tip. The court of appeal stated that, "[Jiudicial
implementations of the Fourth Amendment need constant ac-
commodation to the ever-intensifying technology of surveil-
lance. ' 73 The court concluded that the reasonable expectation
of privacy may ascend into the airspace and claim fourth
amendment protection.7' But then the court determined that
the defendant's subjective expectation of privacy for his con-
traband was not objectively reasonable. Had his crop been
oats or wheat he would have no need for privacy from police
overflight. His choice of crop was not within "the common
habits of mankind," and hence his rights were not violated.7 5
This illustrates the manipulations possible under a sub-
jective interpretation of constitutional protections that Pro-
fessor Amsterdam warned against.7 6 To begin with, as has
often been noted," when the fourth amendment was drafted,
the framers were specifically concerned with abusive govern-
ment searches for contraband. It is a basic principle that the
Constitution protects the innocent and the guilty alike. Fur-
thermore, Triggs and Katz refute the idea that only legal ac-
tivities have an objective claim to privacy. It is certainly not
within "the common habits of mankind" to perform oral cop-
70. Id. at 543, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
71. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
72. 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973).
73. Id. at 116, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
74. Id. at 116, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 588-89.
75. Id. at 117, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
76. See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
77. Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49
CAL. L. REV. 474 (1961); Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth
Amendment, 86 YALE L.J. 1461 (1977).
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ulation in public restrooms nor to conduct gambling opera-
tions over the phone. Essentially, the Dean court has justified
a search by what it turned up. The reasonableness variable in
the test has been utilized to yield a highly unprincipled result.
The latest overflight cases repeat rather than reject this
reasoning.7 In People v. St. Amour79 police were cruising
Humboldt County by air in a general, exploratory search for
marijuana gardens. The court again reasoned that marijuana
cultivation is not within the "common habits" of persons en-
gaged in agriculture. Since the plant grows outside, no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy could be displayed with regard
to overflights.80
People v. Superior Court81 reveals another problem with
the subjective versus objective aspect of the privacy test.
There a police helicopter on patrol spotted stolen auto parts
in the defendant's backyard. The court found there was no
violation of fourth amendment rights because the helicopter
was flying over its normal patrol area. Thus, it appears that
once a method of surveillance slips into routine practice, it is
no longer objectively reasonable to contest it. Helicopters over
the backyards and decks of Californians could become as ac-
cepted and routine as the flashlights of the California High-
way Patrol."2 What further technological developments prom-
ise to become routine?
The reasonableness of a privacy expectation should not
hinge on the state of the technical arts nor on a citizen's
knowledge of what methods are employed as a matter of
course. As Anthony Amsterdam pointed out: "[A]nyone can
protect himself against surveillance by retiring to the cellar,
cloaking all the windows with thick caulking, turning off the
lights and remaining absolutely quiet."88 Personal expecta-
tions of privacy must not be allowed to be categorized as rea-
sonable or unreasonable depending upon what surveillance
methods are currently in vogue. Rather, the lower courts
should focus on the Triggs principle, derived from Katz, that
the method of surveillance itself may be an unreasonable gov-
78. People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1980); Burk-
holder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1979).
79. 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 892, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187, 191 (1980).
80. Id. at 894, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
81. 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974).
82. People v. Boone, 2 Cal. App. 3d 66, 82 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1969).
83. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 402.
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ernment search violating the fourth amendment.
In Burkholder v. Superior Court8 4 the court of appeal re-
cently reaffirmed the validity of overflights, repeating the rea-
soning of Dean that it is not objectively reasonable for a cul-
tivator of contraband to expect privacy from the overflights,
regardless of the remote location. The Burkholder court found
there was no intrusion because the police plane was flying at a
lawful altitude and the marijuana was in plain view. 85 But the
subsequent warrantless police raid along the ground was held
to be an illegal search because police traveled down private
mountain roads, past closed gates and no trespassing signs to
reach the marijuana patch. The defendant did have a right of
privacy along the ground which was "impermissibly trans-
gressed by the police incursion ... ,,s Similarly in St. Amour
the court stated that the no trespassing signs, fences, shrubs,
etc., protected the land from "earthly encroachments" only.87
In these cases a finding of physical intrusion was neces-
sary to trigger fourth amendment protections. Under Katz a
trespass should no longer be needed. If the defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusion into his
marijuana patch by police on foot, he should have a similar
expectation against intrusion by police overhead. If there is a
legally cognizable privacy expectation, then the fourth amend-
ment precludes police observation; niceties about the differing
forms of surveillance, some constituting trespasses and some
not, should not control.88
This was recognized in 1973 by the California Supreme
Court in the case of Lorenzana v. Superior Court.8 ' There the
prosecution argued that because the contested surveillance
was "simple" eavesdropping from a clandestine vantage point,
as opposed to electronically enhanced eavesdropping, no
fourth amendment violation had occurred. The court rejected
that distinction.
We now recognize the constitutional encasement which
84. 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1979).
85. The "plain view" was enhanced by binoculars; see discussion at note 95
infra.
86. 96 Cal. App. 3d at 427, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
87. People v. St. Amour, 104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 892, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187, 190-91
(1980).
88. For another example of the no-intrusion-no-search analysis, this time in the
context of a marijuana sniffing dog, see People v. Matthews, 112 Cal. App. 3d 11, 169
Cal. Rptr. 263 (1980).
89. 9 Cal. 3d 626, 511 P.2d 33, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973).
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renders inviolable the individual's reasonable expectation
of privacy; any governmental intrusion into that privacy
is an "unreasonable search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, whether that intrusion be the tradi-
tional physical search [citations] or a surreptitious audi-
tory invasion [citations] or indeed visual intrusion
[citations] .90
The later lower court decisions in Burkholder and St.
Armour fail to make the equation. Those decisions recognize
fourth amendment protections from traditional physical
searches along the ground but not from visual invasion from
overhead. This inability to see beyond the traditional trespass
analysis leaves the current law in a lamentable contradiction.
If police make observations of outdoor property they must be
careful to remain on public pathways; if they drive their jeeps
off the beaten track, scale fences, or use binoculars"1 they may
have pierced a privacy expectation and performed an illegal
search. But if police take to their airplanes and helicopters,
there is no violation. Privacy expectations previously recog-
nized as reasonable should not be defeated and become unrea-
sonable because of advancing technical capacities of the po-
lice. Triggs and Katz recognize this principle, but California
appellate courts have failed to apply it in plain view-overflight
situations.
D. Enhanced Surveillance: Binoculars
In People v. Arno92 the court of appeal considered obser-
vations enhanced by high-powered binoculars. Police had sta-
tioned themselves on a hilltop across from the Playboy build-
ing in Los Angeles. Over a six hour period they monitored
activities in the building; through the eighth floor windows
they were able to see personnel handling pornographic film.
These observations formed the basis for a search warrant of
the suite.
The court, centering its inquiry on the conduct and
expectations of the persons observed, and noting that Katz
demanded such a focus,98 held that the surveillance was an
illegal search. The court stated:
90. Id. at 639, 511 P.2d at 42, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
91. See text accompanying notes 92-94 infra.
92. 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1979).
93. Id. at 510-11, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 626-27.
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We thus view the test of validity of the surveillance as
turning upon whether that which is perceived or heard is
that which is conducted with a reasonable expectation of
privacy and not upon the means used to view it or hear it.
So long as that which is viewed or heard is perceptible to
the naked eye or unaided ear, the person seen or heard
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in what occurs.
Because he has no reasonable expectation of privacy, gov-
ernmental authority may use technological aids to visual
or aural enhancement of whatever type available. How-
ever, the reasonable expectation of privacy extends to
that which cannot be seen by the naked eye or heard by
the unaided ear. While governmental authority may use a
technological device to avoid detection of its own law en-
forcement activity, it may not use the same device to in-
vade the protected right."
In essence, this establishes a "but for" test for enhanced ob-
servation. If the observation is one that can only be accom-
plished with the use of technological aids, then it violates a
protected privacy right. But for the use of binoculars, would
police in Arno have seen the handling of pornographic film on
the eighth floor of the building? If the answer is no, there is
an illegal search. As such, the test has the virtue of being easy
to understand and apply.
Had the Burkholder court followed this reasoning it
would not have found two differing privacy expectations: a
reasonable expectation for the ground search and an unrea-
sonable expectation for aerial surveillance. The Burkholder
court should have concluded that if the defendant's cultiva-
tion was secluded from* the unaided eye, then he had a consti-
tutionally protected right of privacy. Thus, an airplane should
not have been used to invade that right. Or putting it more
simply, but for the use of a technological aid, here an airplane,
could police have observed the marijuana patch? 95
Nonetheless, the Arno formulation does not lay to rest all
the problems generated by open air searches. Against whom is
this privacy right measured? Whose naked eye or unassisted
94. Id. at 511-12, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
95. Both the Burkholder and the St. Amour courts cited Arno as support for
the use of binoculars from the airplane. The courts stated that the officer in the plane
merely used binoculars to provide greater detail of what was already visible to the
naked eye, and therefore the use was sanctioned by Arno. There is, however, no dis-
cussion of how the officer's naked eye got where it was. This is indeed myopic use of
legal principles.
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ear is involved? We have seen that privacy expectations with
regard to police may differ from those with regard to passers-
by." If anyone at all might have seen the place or overheard
the person in question, does that mean all privacy expectation
vanishes and police may employ some form of technologically
enhanced surveillance? For example, two persons are sitting
and talking on a park bench thinking they are unobserved and
unheard when a passer-by briefly intrudes on their solitude.
Arno might permit police to activate hidden cameras or turn
on high-powered telescopes; however Triggs would differenti-
ate between the expectation of privacy from potential mem-
bers of the public and the expectation of privacy from the po-
lice. In the latter case, Triggs would require probable cause to
initiate clandestine surveillance.
The Arno formulation would probably not have protected
Triggs and his co-defendant. They had taken the risk of being
observed by others entering the restroom, and thus it is argua-
ble that their activities were perceptible to the naked eye.
Under Arno police would be free to retreat to the vents to
avoid detection of their own law enforcement activities. Under
Triggs, however, all privacy expectations are not waived be-
cause a person risks casual observation by members of the
public. This issue is not recognized in Arno.
In Arno police used technological aids to penetrate the
traditionally protected area of a building interior. The under-
lying problem was a covert intrusion; the police used technol-
ogy to avoid a physical trespass into a protected area.97 If,
however, the person observed is in the open and out of his
curtilage, then the result is uncertain. In such a situation the
proper analytical framework is better found in Triggs where
the problem before the court involved a defendant observed
outside the traditionally protected curtilage area. The Triggs
court suggested a probable cause requirement for initiating
enhanced surveillance of persons outside traditionally pro-
tected areas. Any probable cause requirement is absent from
the Arno formulation.
96. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
97. The Arno court referred to the Watergate break-in and questioned whether
it would "have been any less intrusive had the sought after results been achieved by
modern technology located outside the building." 90 Cal. App. 3d at 511, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 627.
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IV. A PROPOSED TEST
As the cases discussed have revealed, the lower courts
have been reluctant to implement fully the Triggs rationale.
Undoubtedly there is some uncertainty as to the extent its
principles should be extended beyond the restroom situation
to enhanced surveillance in general. There is judicial uncer-
tainty as to whether principles enunciated with regard to po-
lice vantage point should apply to police use of technology.
Absent any clear direction in the language of the Triggs opin-
ion about the scope of its application, the lower courts tend to
return to a trespass analysis, However, if the courts set out to
find such an intrusion, they may beg the question of what pri-
vacy rights persons in the open are entitled to.
The Arno court's suggestion, patterned as a "but for"
test, has the advantage of being easy to understand and to
apply. As with the old trespass doctrine, the parameters of the
privacy expectation can be drawn with relative simplicity. The
Arno court's test is not, however, sufficiently comprehensive.
It fails to specify whose "unassisted ear" or "unaided eye" is
the starting point of analysis and what vantage point that eye
or ear may enjoy. Thus, the Arno test leaves open the possi-
bility of wholesale electronic surveillance of public places. 8
Triggs suggests at least two important concepts applica-
ble to open air searches. First, a distinction should be recog-
nized between the reasonable expectation of privacy that can
be asserted against police and that which can be asserted
against passers-by. Second, the method of surveillance may be
sufficiently clandestine or inescapable as to require probable
cause before initiating its use. If these two concepts are writ-
ten into the Arno formulation, we can derive a workable rule
to regulate open air searches. Such a rule would be bottomed
on the fourth amendment and on the California constitutional
right of privacy. As the Arno court stated:
The federal constitutional right against intrusion into the
reasonable expectation of privacy is amplified by the spe-
cific right of privacy guaranteed by article 1, section 1, of
the California Constitution. The California constitutional
guarantee is motivated by concern against contemporary
society's accelerating encroachment upon personal free-
98. Currently, in Santa Cruz County, police station themselves in the hills with
"Spyscopes." These enable detailed observations over a several mile radius including
the parking lots, shopping centers, and streets of the area.
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dom and security caused by increased surveillance and
data collection. [citations] It seems virtually tailored to
meet the situation here involved."
The rule could be stated as follows: the test for the valid-
ity of covert or technologically enhanced surveillance should
turn upon whether that which is perceived or heard is con-
ducted with a reasonable expectation of privacy and that ex-
pectation should not depend on the surveillance means used.
So long as that which is viewed or heard is in fact perceptible
to the naked eye or unaided ear of the government agent
whose vantage point is neither unreasonably clandestine nor
assisted by mechanical devices, the person seen or heard has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in what occurs. Where
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy as against the
government agent, law enforcement may then use covert
means of scrutiny including whatever technological aids are
available to avoid detection of the surveillance activity. The
reasonable expectation of privacy extends to that which can-
not be heard by the unaided ear nor seen by the naked eye of
the state, and any surveillance of that protected sphere must
be sanctioned by a search warrant on a showing of probable
cause, or bottomed on one of the traditional warrant
exceptions.
Such a test would maintain the Katz focus on the con-
duct and manifested privacy expectations of the individual
observed, thus eliminating any intrusion analysis. The test
would also preserve the "but for" aspect of the Arno test.
Without the use of the electronic beeper, airplane, telescope
or whatever, could the police have made this observation? If
not, then the observation has interfered with a privacy expec-
tation protected by the fourth amendment.
The "but for" factor would also provide a brake against
deterioration of privacy standards. The objective versus sub-
jective dichotomy can be manipulated to provide a loophole
for increased levels of surveillance. The proposed test would
make it clear that an expectation of freedom from technologi-
99. 90 Cal. App. 3d at 511, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 627. Currently pending before the
California Supreme Court is De Lancie v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 3d 519, 159
Cal. Rptr. 20 (1979), hearing granted, Nov. 1979. It poses the issue of electronic sur-
veillance in jails, an area that traditionally is not protected by the fourth amendment.
The court of appeal held that art. 1, § 1 of the California Constitution protects the
public and the inmates from indiscriminate observation by means of electronic sur-
veillance in jail visiting rooms.
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cally enhanced scrutiny is objectively reasonable. Further-
more, by making it explicit that the reasonableness of the pri-
vacy expectation is being measured against the state, and by
requiring that all observation be made by unassisted police in
the open, generalized surveillance of public places will be fore-
stalled. Thus, the police would need to show probable cause
prior to most forms of enhanced scrutiny of open places.
If, for example, an individual carelessly exposes his con-
traband on a crowded street, he has no reasonable expectation
of privacy from officers spotting such activity. Police would be
free to retreat to a safe distance and observe him at greater
leisure with binoculars or any other device. But police would
not be free to monitor potential narcotics transactions by set-
ting up a hidden, remote control camera system in a suspected
high drug area. The indiscriminate observations such a cam-
era records would normally not be visible to the naked eye of
the police. Hence, they would invade the observed persons'
reasonable expectations of privacy and require a search war-
rant upon a showing of probable cause.
The need for a search warrant will not be unduly burden-
some to legitimate police work. Most forms of enhanced sur-
veillance (beepers, airplanes, stationed observations with high
powered telescopes) require advance planning and consume
time in installation and preparation.100 Hence, requiring su-
pervision of a neutral magistrate should not stymie police ef-
forts. Just as police must maintain and equip their technologi-
cal aids, so too they should check on the overall legality of the
enterprise. Ordinary eavesdropping and police tailing would
not be proscribed. The "unreasonably clandestine vantage
point" limitation should reach only Triggs or Lorenzana type
concealment. Neither should police be unduly handicapped in
a situation where time is of the essence. The established war-
rant exceptions of exigent circumstances, hot pursuit,1' 1 and
fleeting opportunity,'02 which are tailored for police acting
under time pressures, should remain available. Furthermore,
it should be noted that telephonic search warrants are availa-
100. For example, the court in People v. Smith, 67 Cal. App. 3d 638, 648, 136
Cal. Rptr. 764, 769 (1977), noted the time involved in installing the transponder and
the availability of telephonic search wdrrants pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 1526
(b), § 1528 (b) (West 1970).
101. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
102. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-51 (1970).
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ble in California.'"3
V. CONCLUSION
We have seen that fourth amendment protection has
been extended to persons and activities in the open. Under
current decisions that privacy right must yield if certain forms
of police surveillance are employed. What police may not
scrutinize from a distance with binoculars they may, neverthe-
less, be allowed to fly over and observe. Although the Califor-
nia Supreme Court has said that the reasonable expectation of
privacy is inviolable, the appellate courts have developed two
lines of cases that illogically distinguish between ground ob-
servations and aerial observation. Despite apparent rejection
of the trespass doctrine, it remains the underlying form of
analysis in the lower courts.
At present there is no certain standard for analysis of
clandestine or enhanced police surveillance. The courts may
apply Triggs or may resort to a plain view analysis. The rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test presents insufficient guide-
lines and is subject to manipulation. The merger of the Triggs
and Arno tests proposed here should help to rationalize re-
sults. Stripping police scrutiny of technological aids provides a
workable method for measuring the heretofore uncertain
reach of protected privacy. The proposed test should not
hamper legitimate police investigation, and would protect the
privacy interests of the innocent public from indiscriminate
surveillance.
Isabel Gilman
103. See note 100 supra.
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